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RU 486: THE POLITICS OF CHOICEt
I. INTRODUCTION
THE NEW DRUG called RU 486 has sparked a considerable
amount of controversy. On one side are the doctors and patients
who see the drug as a major medical breakthrough. They see
RU 486 as a relatively safe, effective and private method for termi-
nation of a pregnancy. On the other side of the controversy are
those who see RU 486 as a "death pill;" as an easy way to terminate
even more unborn lives than occur at present. This paper presents
that controversy. Part I discusses the science of the RU 486. Part II
presents in detail the social controversy surrounding RU 486. Part
III then discusses how the FDA approval process works and how it
might be applied to RU 486. Next, Part IV shows how politics can
present a major obstacle to RU 486's introduction and discusses
whether these obstacles are constitutionally proscribed. Finally,
Part V considers whether it is wise to allow politics to dictate the
introduction of a beneficial technology.
In the final analysis, even though there are many permissible
ways in which politics may present barriers to RU 486 as another
vehicle for reproductive choice, it would be better to have the FDA
approve the drug. FDA approval will result in the regulation of
RU 486-in the name of safety and choice.
II. THE SCIENCE OF RU 486
Mifepristone, commonly known as RU 486, is a progesterone
antagonist. The hormone progesterone performs a central role in
the menstrual cycle. It causes the lining of the uterus to prepare for
the implantation of a fertilized egg and when no egg implants, the
progesterone level decreases and the lining is expelled.' RU 486 pre-
vents the body from receiving progesterone. The progesterone is
still produced by the body, but the body does not "read" the proges-
t This paper was written under the supervision of Rebecca Dresser, Professor of Law
at Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Direction was also provided by
Professor Jonathan Entin.
1. G.A. THIBODEAU & C.P. ANTHONY, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE BODY,
392-404 (1988).
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terone levels and functions as if it were not present. Depending on
when the progesterone antagonist, RU 486, is introduced into the
body, the effects on the reproductive cycle will vary.
For example, progesterone seems to be essential for ovulation to
occur. Thus, if RU 486 blocks the reception of progesterone, ovula-
tion will not occur. For women whose bodies cannot tolerate the
overload of estrogen found in the "pill," RU 486 presents a valuable
alternative. The drawback of this use is that in order to maintain
suppression of ovulation, RU 486 must be taken constantly.2 Also
because the long term effects of RU 486 are unknown, RU 486
taken as an ovulation suppressor does not appear to be an accepta-
ble alternative to "the pill". RU 486 may also be used as an "im-
plantation inhibitor" similar to the IUD. RU 486 taken during the
last 10-12 days of the cycle in small amounts may suppress proges-
terone enough to make the uterine lining uninhabitable and thus
prevent implantation.3 However, the natural variation of the men-
strual cycle presents a problem for this type of use because it is
difficult to determine when to start taking the drug.4
The most commonly thought of use for RU 486 is as a "morn-
ing after" pill. This is a misconception. The drug is actually taken
at the end of the cycle, before the expected menstrual period, rather
than the "morning after" unprotected sexual intercourse. RU 486
inhibits the physical action of progesterone, causing the lining of the
uterus to be expelled. As a result, RU 486 could be used in this
manner as a "menstrual regulator." While this use of RU 486 has
advantages over currently used steroid preparations for providing
postcoital contraception, 5 RU 486 taken alone is only 80% effec-
tive.6 Given a 20% chance of pregnancy after unprotected sex,
RU 486 as a menstrual regulator has an overall failure rate of 4%.7
Because of this failure rate, Dr. Baulieu, RU 486's primary re-
2. Dowie, The American Health Interview: Reluctant Crusader, Etienne - Emile Bau-
lieu, 1990 AM. HEALTH 81 (Mar. 1990).
3. Cherfas & Palca, Hormone Antagonist with Broad Potential, 245 ScI. 1322 (1989).
4. Baulieu, Contragestion and Other Clinical Applications ofRU 486, an Antiprogester-
one at the Receptor, 245 ScI. 1351, 1355 (1989); Nieman, The Progesterone Antagonist
RU 486: A Potential New Contraceptive Agent, 316 NEw ENG. J. MED. 187 (1987).
5. Baulieu, supra note 4.
6. Id.
7. (20% chance of failure x 20% chance of pregnancy). Baulieu states that the 4%
failure rate is "too high for the monthly use of RU 486 as a menses inducer." Baulieu, supra
note 4, at 1355. This may seem odd because the RU 486 as an abortion technique has a 4%
failure rate as well. Baulieu seems to mean by this comment that women cannot and should
not depend on the RU 486 every month, but rather should use it only occasionally when
necessary, that is when the threat of pregnancy is great.
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searcher, suggests that RU 486 should be reserved only for occa-
sional postcoital contraception after unprotected sex and should not
be relied upon for "menstrual regulation." 8
Finally, we come to the use of RU 486 which has stirred so
much controversy - interruption of pregnancy.9 RU 486 has been
shown to be an effective method for the termination of pregnancy in
the first 7-8 weeks of pregnancy. 0 Again, RU 486 blocks reception
of progesterone, thus causing the lining of the uterus to break down
and then to be naturally expelled in much the same way a menstrual
cycle occurs.
In France, over 2,115 women at 450 centers have used the
RU 486 procedure with a success rate of 96%." The procedure
used in France consists of a single dose of RU 486 taken orally,
followed about 3 days later by a small dose of synthetic pros-
taglandin.' 2 Prostaglandins help induce the womb to contract and
expel its contents. 3 Alone, prostaglandins have been used to inter-
rupt early pregnancy but this use is considered unacceptable due to
undesireable side effects. 14 However, these unacceptable side effects
are significantly lessened when prostaglandins are taken in small
doses, and when taken in conjunction with RU 486 the result is an
increased success rate in the interruption of pregnancy."1
After the prostaglandin is taken, the woman will experience
bleeding and expulsion in about 24 hours. The bleeding continues
for about 10 days 16 which is only slightly longer than after abortion
8. Id.
9. Cahill, Abortion Pill RU 486: Ethics, Rhetoric and Social Practice, HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 5 (Oct/Nov 1987).
10. The time in which RU 486 can be used effectively has varied. The latest study done
on the effectiveness of RU 486 in France states that RU 486 was administered in cases of
pregnancy of less than 49 days or 7 weeks. The study defined "duration of pregnancy" as
"duration of amenorrhea [absence of bleeding] calculated from the first day of the last men-
strual period." Silvestre, Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy with Mifepristone (R U 486) and
a Prostaglandin Analogue, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 645 (1990). Fertilization is assumed to
occur 14 days after the start of the last menses and thus the women to whom RU 486 was
administered were actually not more than 5 weeks pregnant. (14 days [days which she was
most likely not pregnant] - 49 days = 35 or 5 weeks). All durations in this paper will refer
not to the actual duration of the pregnancy, but rather in terms of number of weeks since the
last menses.
11. Kolata, After Large Study of Abortion Pill, French Maker Considers Wider Sale, N.
Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1990, at 8, col. 2; Silvestre, supra note 10.
12. Baulieu, supra note 4, at 1354.
13. Palca, The Pill of Choice, 245 Sci. 1319, 1320 (1989).
14. Baulieu, supra note 4, at 1354. These side effects include intense nausea, vomiting
and cramps.
15. Ia
16. Id.
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by vacuum aspiration.17 The bleeding with the RU 486 is typical of
a heavy menstruation period. 8 RU 486 is then metabolized by the
body 9 and the ovulatory cycle is restored.2"
Some commentators, as well as the drugs opponents, have ex-
pressed a fear over the effects of RU 486 on a continued pregnancy
as a result of an unsuccessful RU 486 procedure.2' Abortion oppo-
nents cite studies in rabbits that showed a malformed skull as a
result of an unsuccessful termination.22 This effect, however, has
little relevance for humans. The malformed skull in the rabbit oc-
curs as a result of the contraction of the uterus caused by the pros-
taglandin.23 However, the size of the rabbit's uterus in relation to
the fetus bears little relationship to the human uterus in relation to
the fetus at 7 weeks. Thus, this malformity appears to be unique to
the animal and presents little danger to a human fetus.24 Further,
although RU 486 does cross the placenta to the fetus, there is no
evidence of a teratogenic or fetotoxic effect.25
There is also concern for the fertility of women after repeated
RU 486 procedures. But, since the drug functions by depriving the
system of a vital element rather than overloading it with one, as in
the case of administration of high doses of estrogen currently used
in rape, it is anticipated to be relatively free of long term conse-
26quences. 6 Further, the high rate of metabolism of RU 486 in the
body decreases the likelihood of long-term effects. 27 Further, there
is an anecdotal report by Dr. Baulieu that there have been at least
three women who have successfully brought pregnancies to term
with no adverse side effects.28
III. THE CONTROVERSY: POLITICS AND CHOICE
A. The Effect of RU 486 on Social Practices
The RU 486 procedure has sparked a significant amount of con-
17. Id
18. Id.
19. An important feature of the RU 486 is its metabolism in the body. RU 486 metabo-
lizes from the body in about 12 - 24 hours. Baulieu, supra note 4, at 1353.
20. Id.
21. Cahill, supra note 9, at 6.
22. Dowie, supra note 2, at 85.
23. Silvestre, supra note 10, at 648.
24. Dowie, supra note 2, at 85.
25. Baulieu, supra note 4, at 1355.
26. Cahill, supra note 9, at 5.
27. Baulieu, supra note 4, at 1356.
28. Id. at 1355.
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troversy. This controversy revolves around the changes that may
occur in the practice of abortion and the consequential impact that
those changed social practices may have on the abortion debate.
The RU 486 procedure, as discussed above, amounts to the tak-
ing of a few pills within the first 7-8 weeks of pregnancy and then a
shot or suppository a few days later. The pills can be obtained by
any physician willing to prescribe them which eliminates the need
to travel to an abortion clinic. Finally, the abortion occurs in the
privacy of the woman's home in the form of what has been charac-
terized as a "heavy menstrual period."
This procedure has the potential to have notable consequences
on reproductive practices in the United States. There are approxi-
mately 3 million unplanned pregnancies in the U.S. each year of
which about half are aborted.29 Of those pregnancies aborted, only
half are performed in the first eight weeks of pregnancy.30 In
France, one out of four pregnancies are terminated using the RU
486 procedure.31 If the statistics hold true, this would amount to
approximately 400,000 pregnancies terminated in the U.S. by the
RU 486 procedure.
The fact that RU 486 can only be used in the first 8 weeks of
pregnancy may lead to more pregnancies terminated prior to eight
weeks. Typical surgical abortions performed before eight weeks
have a greater chance of failure than abortions performed later 2
because the fetus is so small before eight weeks that it is easily
missed during the procedure.33 Thus, women may be dissuaded
from earlier abortions for fear of failure of the procedure. 34 How-
ever, the RU 486 procedure works best in the early weeks of preg-
nancy, and therefore, those women who must wait or risk failure,
may be able to have earlier abortions.
The RU 486 may also change the practice of "waiting and put-
ting off" confirmation of pregnancy fears. Women often put off con-
29. Fraser, The 'Abortion Pill'. Why America Trails Europe?, Newsday, July 5, 1988.
30. KLrrSCH, RU 486: THE SCIENCE AND THE POLITICS, 12 (1990).
31. IL
32. Id.
33. Id. at 13.
34. Even though the RU 486 procedure has a 4% failure rate which is comparable to
the failure rate of early surgical abortion, the effectiveness of surgical abortions depends to a
certain extent on the skills of the provider and therefore in actuality the effectiveness rate of
the early surgical abortion may vary from provider to provider. While the RU 486 effective-
ness rate has no relation to the skill of the provider, and therefore remains constant, the effect
of this is that the provider may dissuade a woman from an abortion which he feels is too early
because he is not confident of his skill to perform the earlier abortion. See Klitsch, supra note
30, at 12.
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firming pregnancy fears in hopes that they are not pregnant. By the
time the pregnancy is confirmed and the abortion decision made,
the pregnancy has progressed to or beyond eight weeks.35 Depend-
ing on the acceptance of the RU 486 procedure,36 with the knowl-
edge that RU 486 could only be used prior to eight weeks, women
may be more willing to seek early confirmation of pregnancy fears
in order to take advantage of the procedure. Thus RU 486 may
make an earlier abortion a more desirable alternative to the stress of
worrying about a potential pregnancy.
B. The Ethical Controversy
It is the possibility that earlier abortion may become less pain-
ful, less humiliating, and perhaps more frequent, that has sparked
the ethical and political debate. The primary concern of the oppo-
nents of RU 486 is that easy access to early abortion will be a disin-
centive to contraception and will discourage self-critical abortion
decisions.3 7 Opponents of RU 486 fear that the abortion decision
will be trivialized by a small pill taken at home.38 They feel that
women will not undertake a discriminating decision to abort; that
they will enter into the abortion without fully contemplating the
implications of their decision to abort.3 9
These fears may have some merit but they significantly devalue
the fact that abortion is a traumatic decision at any point during
pregnancy.' The fact that abortion will be less public and less hu-
miliating, as women will no longer be forced to cross picket lines
and engage in violence in order to obtain the abortion, does not
lessen the fact that she has chosen to abort her pregnancy. Most
women will still prefer to avoid the decision, regardless of the ease
of the procedure. Thus, the fear that contraceptives will be forgone
in the face of the RU 486 is unwarranted.
35. Miecheal Klitsch, of the Allan Guttmacher Foundation, states that on the average
five weeks pass before a woman will suspect that she is pregnant and another 3 weeks pass
before she is willing to confirm her pregnancy. Id.
36. Few studies have been conducted on this subject, but because of the increased pri-
vacy (i.e. the woman would not have to go to the abortion clinic and be subjected to picket
lines) associated with the procedure and the non-invasiveness of the procedure, it appears
that at least some women would opt for the RU 486 procedure. At least one small study done
in England stated that 10 out of the 13 participants preferred the RU 486 to the surgical
method. Urquhart & Templeton, Acceptability of Medical Pregnancy Termination, 1988 LAN-
CET 106.
37. Cahill, supra note 9, at 5.
38. Kolata, supra note 11.
39. Id.
40. 134 Cong. Rec. E 1328 (May 2, 1988).
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Further, the argument that women will prefer RU 486 to con-
traception assumes that the RU 486 procedure is easier than avoid-
ing the abortion decision and that the RU 486 procedure is less
traumatic than current abortion procedures. Although women may
prefer RU 486 because of its noninvasive nature and increased pri-
vacy as opposed to surgical abortion, the procedure may not be con-
sidered as "easy" as surgical abortion.
First, the length of the RU 486 procedure cuts against the argu-
ment that it is easier than surgical abortion. With RU 486 a woman
will have to make at least 3 trips to her practitioner to complete the
procedure. Further, the abortion with RU 486 is not complete for
at least 24 hours.41 In a surgical abortion the procedure is per-
formed and the abortion complete when the woman leaves the abor-
tion clinic. Thus, the RU 486 places the burden of the abortion on
the woman who can only be blatantly aware of the consequences of
her choice.
Further, the argument that RU 486 will trivialize the abortion
decision carries even less weight. With RU 486 there is the distinct
possibility that the woman will be able to see the fetus that she
aborts as the fetus may be expelled during the bleeding.' This leads
to the conclusion that women who abort using this procedure may
be likely to experience more psychological distress and may be more
aware of the consequences of their decision than with surgical abor-
tion. Consequently, women will become even more conscious of
their decision and perhaps even more likely to avoid abortions in
the future.
The ethical arguments that the RU 486 procedure will frustrate
contraceptive use and trivialize the abortion decision is certainly
groundless. In fact, women may find that with RU 486 the abortion
decision takes on greater significance because they are no longer
passive witnesses to the procedure, rather they are the actor and
they cannot deny responsibility for their choice.43
C. The Effect of RU 486 on the Abortion Debate
Some commentators have expressed the opinion that RU 486
41. Silvestre, supra note 10, at 646.
42. Greenhouse, Drug Maker Stops All Distribution of Abortion Pill, N.Y. Times, Oct.
27, 1988, at 12, col. 3.
43. Janet Callu, Associate Director of the Atlanta Feminist Women's Health Center
said of the French women who have participated in the clinical trials that "[tihey feel in
control, conscious that they are doing this to themselves, not just as a patient." Lake, The
New French Pill, 117 MCCALLS 62 (1990).
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could have the effect of total diffusion of the abortion debate. Leo-
nard Cole of Rutgers University suggests that, on a personal level
regardless of legalities, the RU 486 may simply make abortion "a
matter of fact" and thus, a "nonissue." 4 He cites the contraceptive
debate of the mid-sixties for the proposition that technological ad-
vances aid in taking the issue from the public forum. Granted, the
Supreme Court's verdict in Griswold v. Connecticut45 helped clear
up the contraceptive debate, but Professor Cole correctly states that
"[n]o court edict, however, could suddenly uproot an individual's
moral rationale for opposing birth control. '4 6 He further asserts
that the widespread use of "the pill" diffused the issue of "whether
or not it should be used," and focused the issue on whether or not a
woman wanted to use the drug.47
Likewise, RU 486 may make abortion simply a matter of fact
rather than a matter of public debate. The abortion debate has Roe
v. Wade48 to give it legal sanction in the same way Griswold gave
legal sanction to contraceptive use. But, as Professor Cole points
out, the contraceptive debate had a drug which took the debate
from the public forum. And now the abortion debate possesses a
drug which may be exactly what is needed to subside the public
debate. Unfortunately, the abortion debate has a fetus where the
contraceptive debate had only prevention of conception. This may
be enough, even with Roe and RU 486, to keep abortion from be-
coming 'a matter of fact'.
On a more concrete level, RU 486 may have the effect of taking
some of the abortion opponents' political tools out of their arsenal
and, at least, reduce the furor of the debate. For example, even
though RU 486 should be taken under medical supervision, that
supervision can be obtained from any doctor not necessarily from
an abortion clinic.49 Thus, the Right to Life activists may find them-
selves without a place to picket and protest.5 0 On that same line,
because the fetus is aborted at a very early stage, the abortion oppo-
nents may lose one of their most effective weapons - gory pictures
of aborted fetuses. Finally, public concern over abortion appears to
be linked to the gestational age of the fetus,5 thus, the early abor-
44. Cole, The End of the Abortion Debate, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 217, 223 (1989).
45. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
46. Cole, supra note 44, at 222.
47. Ia (emphasis added).
48. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
49. Palca, supra note 13, at 1319.
50. Id.
51. Lake, supra note 43, at 61.
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tion performed with RU 486 may reduce public concern over abor-
tion. This lessening of the public outcry coupled with the loss of
certain visible political tools may just "rescue the nation from a
political nightmare" as Cole predicts. 2
At the legal level, RU 486 may strengthen the woman's privacy
interest and therefore help to diffuse the abortion debate within the
courts. The woman's privacy interest is strengthened because
RU 486 can be taken at home. The Court in Griswold placed great
emphasis on the ability of the state to police the use of contracep-
tives and the inherent notion that the decision to use contraceptives
fell within the "privacies of life." 3 The Court further stated that it
would be repulsive to our sense of liberty to allow the police to enter
a bedroom to look for "telltale" signs of conceptive use. 4 As in
Griswold, the fact that the act is done in the privacy of the home as
opposed to the medical setting may bring the privacy interest fur-
ther within the realm of Griswold and "the privacies of life."'55
However, this does not appear to be a realistic distinction. Even
though the majority in Griswold noted that the privacy of the mari-
tal bedroom and marriage in general were of foremost concern, 56
cases such as Eisenstadt v. Barid57 and Carey v. Population Services
International58 further clarified and limited the holding in Griswold.
The Supreme Court stated in Eisenstadt that "it is the right of the
individual to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child."5 9 Hence, the focus is not on the physical
place where the act takes place which grants it protection; it is the
privacy interest in making the decision which grants it constitu-
tional approval. The privacy interest in the abortion debate is sim-
ply whether a woman has the right to choose to terminate a
pregnancy.
However, even though RU 486 may not strengthen the woman's
privacy interest, it may weaken the states' ability to intrude upon
this private decision making. Because RU 486 is used so early in
52. Cole, supra note 44, at 223.
53. 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
54. Id
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right to privacy extends to unmarried persons' access to
contraception).
58. 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (state may not require only licensed pharmacists to distribute
contraception).
59. 405 U.S. at 488.
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the pregnancy, the states' interest may not be strong enough to
trump a woman's fundamental right to make personal decisions re-
garding childbirth. Even though Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services I significantly narrowed the holding in Roe v. Wade 61 it did
not overrule Roe's main holding - that a woman has a fundamen-
tal right to decide whether to bear a child.62 In Webster, the Court
decided that the trimester framework of Roe had lost its usefulness
due to the advances of medical science.63 The simple holding of the
Court was that the state had a compelling interest in protection of
potential life at viability and therefore could require testing to deter-
mine viability.64 This holding in no way changes the fact that a wo-
man still has a fundamental right to privacy, including the right to
abort her pregnancy. The only thing that has changed is the nature
of the state's interest at different points in the pregnancy. RU 486 is
used early in the pregnancy, and therefore, it is doubtful that the
state could advance a compelling enough interest in potential life
prior to eight weeks which would override the woman's right to
privacy. Thus, so long as a woman still has a right to an abortion,
the use of the RU 486 procedure may help to protect and reinforce
that right.
All of the above comments are, of course, speculative but re-
gardless of the specific effects that RU 486 may have on the practice
of abortion and the abortion debate, the fact remains that this po-
tent drug will have some sort of impact. The opponents of RU 486
fear this impact and appear willing to use everything within their
power to prevent the use of RU 486 in the United States. The re-
mainder of this paper will focus on what forces could withhold RU
486 from U.S. women and how politics plays a role in that
withholding.65
60. 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989).
61. 401 U.S. 113 (1973).
62. 109 S.Ct. at 3058 ("This case therefore affords us no occasion to revisit the holding
of Roe, which was that the Texas statute unconstitutionally infringes on the right to an abor-
tion derived from the Due Process Clause, and we leave it undisturbed'(citations omitted)).
63. Id. at 3056.
64. Id. at 3056-57.
65. The rest of the paper assumes that a corporation, either Rousell or an American
corporation, will choose to market RU 486 in this country. This is, of course, a huge leap of
faith because a corporation will need to decide first whether there is a market large enough
for the drug; whether the venture would be profitable. Corporations do not "champion"
causes unless those causes will be profitable. Second, the corporation will need to deal with
the inhospitable legal climate in the U.S concerning products liabilities. One of the major
reasons cited for the lack of reproductive technologies entering the market is the huge cost of
defending, not to mention losing, products liabilities law suits. And lastly, the corporation
will need to be able to survive the abortion politics in the U.S.. There is always the potential
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IV. GOVERNMENTAL OBSTACLES
A. FDA Approval Process
What impact RU 486 will have on abortion practices and
whether, in fact, it will diffuse the abortion debate is really a moot
point at present. Until RU 486 is made available in the United
States we will not know the answers to those questions. RU 486 has
numerous obstacles to overcome before it will be available in the
U.S., and one of the most significant appears to be approval by the
federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
Generally, before any drug intended for human use can be
shipped in interstate commerce, it must be approved as "safe and
effective" by the FDA.66 This "safe and effective" standard is met
by a showing of "substantial evidence" in support of the safety and
effectiveness of the drug.67 In order to meet this requirement, a
manufacturer must first conduct tests on animals, and then include
these results in its application for an Investigational New Drug ex-
emption (IND).68 The IND allows the manufacturer to ship the
drug in interstate commerce for further testing on humans.69 The
results of these clinical studies on humans, which take two to ten
years to obtain, become the basis for a New Drug Application
(NDA) which permits the drug to be marketed. The FDA then re-
views the application to determine 1) if the drug is safe and effec-
tive, 2) whether it can be manufactured consistently, and 3) whether
the benefits of the drug outweigh the risks.7' This is an extraordina-
rily burdensome and expensive procedure71 but is typically the only
for boycott from the anti-abortionists. Also, the company must take into consideration the
instability of the right to abortion. But see supra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
66. Federal law states that "[n]o person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into
interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed pursuant to
subsection (b)... of this section is effective with respect to such drug." 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)
(1984).
67. 21 U.S.C. § 335(d) (1984). The burden of showing that there is substantial evidence
is on the manufacturer of the drug. This burden is met by "evidence consisting of adequate
and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by
scientific training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug.. .[and to] con-
cluden ... that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have. . ." 21
U.S.C. § 335(d).
68. Issacs & Holt, Drug Regulation, Product Liability and the Contraceptive Crunch:
Choices are Dwindling, 8 J. LEGAL MED. 533, 534 (1987).
69. 21 C.F.R § 335(i) (Supp. VI 1986) (exemption of "drugs intended solely for investi-
gational use by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to investigate the safety
and effectiveness of drugs" from the requirements of § 335(a)-(h)).
70. Issacs, supra note 68, at 536. The FDA's review primarily consists of a review of the
evidence presented by the manufacturer.
71. The estimated cost to a manufacturer of introducing a single new contraceptive is 50
1991]
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way to introduce a drug into interstate commerce.
An alternative to this process may be availabie for RU 486. In
the past, the FDA required at least some of the data presented for
the basis of approval to be from studies done in the United States.
72
In 1985, however, the FDA promulgated new regulations for the
NDA which allow approval of a new drug solely on the basis of
foreign data. This regulation states:
(b) As sole basis for marketing approval. An application based
solely on foreign clinical data meeting U.S. criteria may be ap-
proved if: (1) The foreign data are applicable to the U.S. popula-
tion and U.S. medical practice; (2) the studies have been
performed by clinical investigators of recognized competence;
and (3) the data may be considered valid without the need for an
on-site inspection by FDA or, if FDA considers such an inspec-
tion to be necessary, FDA is able to validate the data through an
on-site inspection or other appropriate means.
73
This regulation recognizes that the FDA's foremost considera-
tion must be the quality of the data submitted, not the country of
origin.74 Although there is concern over certain problems with for-
eign data, the FDA believes that the regulation addresses these
concerns.
7 5
Most of the numerous studies conducted on RU 486 have been
done in foreign countries,76 thus it would seem that the most expe-
dient way to bring RU 486 to thd United States market is to seek
FDA approval based solely on foreign data. The problem with this
approach is that the FDA has considerable leeway in deciding
whether it will actually approve the drug solely on foreign data.
million dollars. Galen, Birth Control Options Limited by Litigation, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 20,
1986, at 28. See also Rutherford v. American Medical Association, 379 F.2d 641, 643 (7th
Cir. 1967) ("The fact that compliance might be expensive and burdensome is not unfairness
in the procedure, but a consequence of a reasonable Congressional scheme for the introduc-
tion of new drugs").
72. 50 Fed. Reg. 7454 (1985).
73. 21 C.F.R. § 314.106(b) (1985).
74. 50 Fed. Reg. at 7483.
75. Id. at 7484. Of foremost concern is that the data presented is from "adequate and
well-controlled investigations."
76. All of the studies conducted on RU 486 are far too numerous to mention. A selected
few include: Couzinet, Le Strat, Ulnann, Baulieu, Schaison, Termination of Early Pregnancy
by the Progesterone Antagonist RU 486 (mifepristone). 315 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1565 (1986)
(French study); Cameron & Baird, Early Pregnancy Termination: a Comparison Between Vac-
uum Aspiration and Medical Abortion with Prostaglandin or the Antiprogestogen R U 486, 95
BR.J.OBsT.GYN. 271 (1988) (British study); Silvestre, Dubois, Renault, Rezvani, Baulieu, &
Ulmann, Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy with Mifepristone (Ru 486) and a Prostaglandin
Analogue, 322 NEw ENG.J.MED. 645 (1990) (French study). All of these studies have con-
firmed that RU 486 is safe and effective.
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First, the foreign data may be attacked on the grounds of the com-
petency of the investigators." However, based on the international
reputation of the researchers at Rousell, this attack may be fruitless.
Further, the data may be attacked on the grounds of its validity or
the impossibility of an on-site inspection by the FDA inspectors.78
Disputes on the validity of the experiments seem unlikely because
the results of the studies submitted by Rousell have already been
duplicated. Lastly, the investigations themselves can be attacked on
the requirement that they be "adequate and well-controlled
studies."7 9
However, should the FDA decide not to allow foreign data to be
used, RU 486 could still proceed through the normal FDA ap-
proval process. There have already been clinical trials of RU 486 as
an abortifacient in the United States. In 1986, the University of
Southern California tested the drug on approximately 400 women
at a variety of doses in different stages of pregnancy.80 Further re-
search is still being conducted at USC.81 Doctor Misell, director of
the research, described his work as "general research" which consti-
tuted second-stage FDA trials in order to determine the correct
dosage at the various stages of pregnancy. 2 Based on the extensive
use of the RU 486 in France and the research done at USC, there
appears to be enough existing data for submission and approval by
the FDA. 3
The question remains, however, whether the FDA will actually
approve RU 486. The FDA is charged with the responsibility of
determining whether a drug is "safe and effective." 84 This means
that the FDA will investigate whether the drug does what the man-
ufacturer says that it does (effectiveness) and whether the benefits of
using the drug outweigh the risks of using the drug (safety).85 Ap-
plying this standard to RU 486, the FDA would be hardpressed not
to approve the drug. The most recent report on RU 486 shows that
it has an effectiveness rate of 96% and more importantly that it
77. 21 C.F.R § 314.106 (1989). See also, Comments on Proposed Rule, 50 Fed. Reg.
7454 (1985).
78. let
79. 21 U.S.C. § 335(d).
80. Palea, supra note 13, at 1321.
81. Ciolli, U.S. School Expands Abortion Pill Research, Newsday Feb. 28, 1989.
82. Id.
83. Kolata, supra note 11.
84. 21 C.F.R. § 355(d).
85. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,776-39,786 (1977).
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lacked "any major health risks or side effects."86 Another study
shows that the RU 486 procedure is as effective as vacuum aspira-
tion and that it "offers an effective alternative to surgery for early
abortion."8
7
Opponents of the drug cannot dispute that the drug is effective
as a means of abortion. What is disputed is whether the drug meets
the standards of safety. Opponents of the drug argue that taking the
drug may be "risky". They point to the possibility of hemorrhaging
and the possibility of incomplete abortions leading to infections
which might impair future fertility and conclude that these risks are
too great.88
On their own these concerns might be valid; but when viewed in
relation to other means of abortion these concerns lose their valid-
ity. The RU 486 procedure does fail in about 4% of the cases, but
this is comparable to the failure rate of vacuum aspiration.89 Fur-
ther, the incidence of hemorrhaging which indicates transfusion,
appears to be no more frequent than in vacuum aspiration.90 Fi-
nally, even the possibility of ectopic pregnancies which would not
be aborted by RU 486 and the possibility of failure are not sufficient
reasons for the FDA to withhold approval. Rather, these possibili-
ties argue strongly for the medical supervision which would be pro-
vided as a result of FDA regulation of the drug and the
procedure.91
Certainly, the FDA must take these risks into account in an
effort to ensure the "safety and effectiveness" of the drug. The
weight assigned to these risks will depend on the various factors
that go into the decision making process. One of these factors may
unfortunately be the politics of the abortion debate discussed in the
next section.
V. POLITICAL BARRIERS
RU 486 seeks to enter the United States at a time when the
86. Silvestre, supra note 10.
87. Cameron & Baird, Early Pregnancy Termination: a comparison between vacuum as-
piration and medical abortion using prostaglandin or the antiprogestone RU 486, 95
BR.J.OBsT.GYN. 271, 275 (1988).
88. Kolata, supra note 11.
89. A British comparison of vacuum aspiration and RU 486 shows that the failure rate
of 4% with vacuum aspiration and 5% with the RU 486 procedure. Silvestre, supra note 10.
Vacuum aspiration is the most commonly used technique for early abortions. Cameron &
Baird, supra note 87.
90. Id.
91. Silvestre, supra note 10, at 648.
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abortion debate has created an inhospitable political climate. For
example, the Bush Administration has supported restrictions on
RU 486 presented by conservative legislators.92 Further, it is cur-
rently illegal for the National Institutes of Health to support any
research on any abortifacient such as RU 486.1' And finally, the
FDA has already placed restrictions on RU 486. In June of 1989,
the Commissioner of the FDA, Frank Young, wrote to Representa-
tive Robert K. Dornan of California, with a guarantee that the
FDA would not permit the RU 486 to be imported for personal use,
something that the FDA has allowed for other drugs. 94 Therefore,
it is quite possible that regardless of the medical progress that
RU 486 represents, and regardless of the fact that the drug may be
wholly "safe and effective," abortion politics may present a major
barrier to the introduction of RU 486 to the U.S. market.
A. Congressional Politics
The abortion debate has long been an element of the congres-
sional agenda and has strong supporters on both sides. Conse-
quently, it is possible that Congress may use its political power to
prohibit the introduction of RU 486 into the U.S. market. Such
congressional action has, in fact, been attempted. In 1986, Repre-
sentative Robert Dornan of California presented a limitations rider
to the Department of Health and Human Services appropriations
bill which attempted to limit the jurisdiction of the FDA concern-
ing the approval of RU 486. The amendment stated:
"No funds under this Act may be used by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services - (1) to continue an exemption
under Section 505(i) of the FDCA for the drug RU 486 when
used as a drug to cause an abortion or as an abortifacient; or (2)
to consider any application under section 505 of such Act of the
approval of a new drug application for such drug used for such
purpose.
9 5
The use of limitation riders has been consistently criticized. As a
means to establish public policy, the appropriations process is in-
complete and the implementation of limitation riders is plagued by
practical problems.96 But, Congress often resorts to limitation rid-
ers when faced with an emotional issue which needs, in Congress'
92. Id.
93. Palca, supra note 13, at 1321.
94. Id. at 1321.
95. 134 Cong. Rec. H 4243 (1988).
96. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE
L. J. 456, 459 (1987).
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eyes, immediate attention such as in response to pending or recent
agency action or to large scale public protest of court rulings. 97 Ob-
viously, Representative Dornan saw that RU 486 needed the imme-
diate attention of Congress. The rest of his colleagues did not and
the amendment was dropped. 98
The constitutionality of the limitation rider is not disputed,99
but it is not without limits. First, an appropriations rider cannot
impose additional duties on an agency or require judgments and
determinations not otherwise required by law."° This simply means
that Congress can not "legislate" in the appropriation riders; they
can only "appropriate." Furthermore, the action taken by the ap-
propriations rider cannot be in violation of the Constitution.101
Thus, if a "Dornan" type amendment was in fact passed prohibiting
approval of RU 486, two issues would be raised: first, whether the
amendment imposed additional duties on the agency and second,
whether the amendment directs the agency to act in violation of the
Constitution.
Assuming that Congress passed the Doman Amendment, this
amendment might be challenged because it imposes additional du-
ties on the FDA. This type of challenge defeated some of the early
Hyde Amendments which prohibited the use of Medicaid funds for
abortion. The first Hyde Amendment prohibited the use of federal
funds except where the life of the mother was in danger.1 2 The
House Chair found that the amendment could not stand because
the administrative agency would have to determine whether the
mother's health was, in fact, in danger.103 This would impose addi-
tional duties upon the agency.
In the case of the Doman Amendment, it is possible that the
FDA would need to determine if the drug was to be used "to cause
an abortion or as an abortfacient." However, this seems tenuous
because in order for a manufacturer to get an investigational new
drug exemption under section 505(i) of the FDCA, the manufac-
97. Id. at 462.
98. Unfortunately, the final disposition of the amendment is unclear. There is no record
of the rejection of the amendment, there is only the final bill which does not include the
Doman amendment. See H.B. 4783.
99. See Devins, supra note 96, at 471-480.
100. H.R. 21, ci.2, § 843 (reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 534
(1979)).
101. See Devins, supra note 96, at 474. The basic idea is that Congress cannot do any-
thing that is in violation of principles embodied in the Constitution.
102. 123 Cong. Rec. 19,699 (1977).
103. Id.
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turer has the burden of proving that the drug is safe for its intended
use and would be required to state its use as an abortifacient. 104
Thus, the amendment would not place any "additional duties not
required by law" ' upon the FDA.
The only other way that the Dornan amendment could be inval-
idated is by constitutional challenge. One might argue that the pro-
hibition of the FDA's approval of RU 486 is unconstitutional as a
denial of due process of law, in violation of the fifth amendment of
the Constitution. °6 The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade,1 7 held
that the right to privacy implicit in our concept of ordered liberty,
encompasses a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.108 That fundamental right has not been withdrawn.
Even though the Supreme Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services 10 narrowed the holding in Roe, 10 the fundamental right to
an abortion has remained strong.11
However, even though women have the right to seek an abor-
tion, it is settled law that the government is not under a positive
obligation to aid in the exercise of that fundamental right.112 Con-
stitutional rights are typically conceptualized as simply immunities
from active governmental abridgment. 11 This principle was used in
Harris v. McRae114 to allow the "Hyde Amendment" to withstand
constitutional scrunity. The Hyde Amendment, in the form of a
limitations rider, denied federal funding under Medicaid for any
abortion.115 The appellant argued that by not funding abortion the
United States government denied indigent women the right to an
abortion.
The Supreme Court found that the Hyde Amendment left "indi-
gent women with at least the same range of choice in deciding
104. 21 U.S.C. § 335(d).
105. House Rules, supra note 100.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. V (No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of the law...
107. 410 U.S. 113 (1972).
108. Id. at 153.
109. 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989).
110. Id. at 3058 ("To the extent indicated in our opinion, we would modify and narrow
Roe...").
111. The Court in Webster simply enlarged the time at which the state's interest becomes
compelling, which would in effect narrow the scope of the abortion right. But it did not
change the fact that the right to privacy still encompasses the right to seek an abortion.
112. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
113. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315-17 (1980).
114. Id.
115. 123 Cong. Rec. 19,700 (1977).
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whether to obtain a medically necessary abortion as she would have
had if Congress had chosen to subsidize no health care costs at
all."" 6 Even though it found that the government did not have to
remove obstacles to choice, the Court affirmed the fact that "the
government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exer-
cise of her freedom of choice."'
1 7
Thus, realizing the fact that Roe still stands, that women have
the right to seek an abortion, and that although the government
does not have an obligation to fund abortion, the government may
not place obstacles in the way of the exercise of freedom of choice,
the Dornan Amendment appears unconstitutional as an obstacle to
a woman's right to an abortion. By denying the FDA jurisdiction
over RU 486, the United States government would have removed
that option from the realm of choice. This would not have been a
matter of removing obstacles to choice, as in Harris. Rather, the
denial of approval would have been an affirmative obstacle in the
way of a woman's choice in violation of the fifth amendment's due
process clause.
Of course, there is the argument that through the Dornan
Amendment the government would not have infringed upon a wo-
man's right to choose. As in Harris, the choice to terminate a preg-
nancy is still present but simply limited to those procedures
currently available. Also, by approving RU 486 the government
would be using federal funds to fund abortion which Harris and
Maher make clear it is not obligated to do. However, even though
the government is not obligated to fund abortion, it is obligated to
refrain from creating obstacles to that choice. Because RU 486 can-
not become a legal choice without governmental approval, denial of
that approval based solely on the politics of abortion would be an
obstacle to choice which the government cannot create.
Thus, it appears that Congress could not constitutionally pro-
hibit the approval of RU 486 by the FDA. Of course, any decision
on the constitutionality of Congress' action is made by the Supreme
Court and because there are arguments on both sides, the decision
remains unresolved.
B. The FDA and Politics
Presently, without any outright political move by Congress, the
only governmental obstruction to the introduction of RU 486
116. 448 U.S. at 317.
117. Id.
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would be a refusal by the FDA to approve the drug. All the medical
data seem to indicate that the drug is "safe and effective." But that
decision rests with the FDA. What factors the FDA uses to refuse
approval for the drug may cause some concern. Can and should
abortion politics be one of these factors? The question then becomes
- if the FDA does not approve the drug, on what grounds could a
non-approval decision be challenged?
Within certain limits, patients have a constitutional right to
choose among various treatments for their conditions. For example,
in Andrews v. Ballard118 and Rogers v. State Board of Medical Ex-
aminers,1"9 the courts held that the constitutional right of privacy
encompassed the patients access to a particular form of treatment.
In neither case, however, did the patients seek access to an unap-
proved treatment. 120 Further, the Tenth Circuit in Rutherford v.
United States,121 held that although cancer patients had a constitu-
tional right to decide whether or not to seek treatment, the ability to
receive a particular treatment or at least a medication was within
the legitimate area of governmental interest in protecting health.1 22
Thus, it appears that if the FDA did not approve RU 486, a woman
could not claim an invasion of a constitutional right to choose the
RU 486.
There may, however, be an argument that in disapproving
RU 486 the FDA acted arbitrarily and irrationally in violation of its
statutory mandate.1 23 In resolving the safety and effectiveness issue,
the FDA will weigh the drug's potential benefits against the risks
entailed in using the drug. 124 The approval of an NDA by the FDA
must rest on substantial evidence and further the FDA must refuse
approval of an NDA if there is "a lack of substantial evidence that
118. 498 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
119. 371 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 387 So. 2d 937
(Fla. 1980).
120. In Andrews, the plaintiffs sought access to acupuncture which the state sought to
regulate out of existence. The District Court found that the statute was unconstitutional be-
cause the state had no compelling state interest. 498 F. Supp. at 1041.
121. 616 F.2d 455 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 937 (1980).
122. See id.; People v. Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d 697, 708-09 (1979).
123. § 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act states that a reviewing court
"shall... (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law." 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1986). Further, the FDA's statutory mandate directs the FDA to decide
approval issues based on a substantial evidence standard. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(5) (the Secretary
may refuse approval if "there is a lack of substantial evidence" in support of the safety and
effectiveness of the drug (emphasis added)).
124. Note, A Constitutional Analysis of Federal Drug Marketing Regulations and Food
and Drug Administration Implementation, 13 Sw. U.L. REv. 531, 550 (1983).
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the drug is effective.125 Substantial evidence is defined by statute as
evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investiga-
tion, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by sci-
entific training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the
drug involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and respon-
sibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the
effect it purports to have... 6
This substantial evidence standard appears rather objective, but
it is possible that the FDA could manipulate the standard and find
that 1) the studies were not adequate and well-controlled or 2) that
the experts who did the studies were not of sufficient competency to
evaluate the drug. Thus, the question on judicial review would be
whether the FDA's refusal was justified based on the lack of sub-
stantial evidence presented by the manufacturer. As was discussed
above, there appears to be enough evidence to substantiate the claim
that RU 486 is safe and effective. Thus, the FDA would need to be
certain that it was not the abortion politics which caused the denial
of approval for RU 486.
Another possible argument which may lead to some recourse for
the manufacturer of RU 486 if the FDA were to refuse approval is
the rule of law that "an administrative hearing of such importance
and vast potential consequences must be attended, not only with
every element of fairness but with the very appearance of complete
fairness."127 This means that the persons who make the determina-
tion of approval or disapproval must not have shown any tendency
that they "pre-judged" the application before hearing all the evi-
dence. The implications of this pre-judgment rule for RU 486 is that
any person within the FDA who sits in judgment of RU 486 must
not have stated views that he or she would not approve the drug. If
they do so, they must be disqualified. Frank Young, Commis-
sioner of the FDA, informed Representative Dornan that the FDA
would not allow RU 486 to be brought into the country for personal
use.128 This may lead to his disqualification from the hearing board
of RU 486's application because it could be argued that he has al-
ready pre-judged the drug and thus would deny the manufacturer
due process as a result. It could be argued, however, that the deci-
sion to allow importation for personal use is based on other factors,
125. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westeott and Dunning, 412 U.S. 609, 630 (1972); § 21
C.F.R. § 355(d)(1986).
126. 21 C.F.R. § 355(d)(7) (Supp IV. 1986).
127. Amos Treat & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 306 F.2d 260,267 (D.C.
Cir. 1962).
128. Palca, supra note 13.
[Vol. 1:77
RU 486
unlike those used to approve the drug for marketing and thus have
no bearing on his views on the safety and effectiveness of the drug.
All of this discussion, of course, assumes that politics may infil-
trate the FDA's decision making process and that as a result the
FDA would not approve the drug. This may not be true however.
In prior years the FDA has received requests not to approve a drug
simply based on abortion politics. When Searle sought approval of a
drug used to treat ulcers, the FDA was inundated with requests by
abortion opponents not to approve the drug because one of the side
effects of the drug was the causing of abortion.12 9 Abortion oppo-
nents feared that the drug would be used primarily for abortion. 130
The FDA approved it nonetheless.13 Thus, it appears that the
FDA may not be susceptible to influence by politics and would base
its approval or refusal simply on the objective criteria set forth by
statute.
VI. NEED FOR GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION
OF RU 486
Although it appears that there may be ways to ensure that the
politics of abortion do not infiltrate the approval process of RU 486,
it is possible that it may. It is also possible that Congress may find
some constitutional way to ensure refusal of RU 486, but that re-
fusal to approve may not be a wise thing to do. Many commentators
have suggested that without governmental regulation an illegal
black market would make the drug available. 32 A black market
might be supplied by doctors receiving the drug from Roussell or
wholesalers. There is also the possibility of any chemist synthesizing
the drug. 33 Thus, it is quite possible that if the United States gov-
ernment does not regulate the RU 486 there will be a black market
and the dangers of misuse associated with a black market.
The potential for misuse of a black market for RU 486 poses a
great threat to the safety of women in the U.S. The drug, without a
doctor's supervision, may be used later in a pregnancy which could
lead to hemorrhaging without termination of the pregnancy. There
is also the possibility of an incomplete expulsion which could result
in infection.134 Further, there would probably be no follow up medi-
129. Klitsch, supra note 30, at 16.
130. Id
131. Id.
132. Id at 17.
133. Id
134. Fraser, The "Abortion Pill" Why America Trails Europe?, Newsday, July 5, 1988.
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cal supervision to alert the woman to the need for medical attention
until it was too late.135 Lastly, those who would be likely to obtain
the drug on the black market would be those to whom the govern-
ment should give the most protection - teenagers, the uneducated,
and the poor.
The fact of the matter is that RU 486 will get to the market
because of its potential in other areas of medicine. It is this fact
which speaks strongly for its approval and regulation by the FDA.
"Once a drug is approved by the FDA for one use, there is no fed-
eral law prohibiting a doctor from prescribing it for other rea-
sons." '136 Thus, there would be an even greater supply for the black
market, and the drug would be used for abortion whether the gov-
ernment likes it or not.
VII. CONCLUSION
RU 486 presents an interesting case study in medicine and poli-
tics. Many think that politics should not play any role in medical
decisions at all. In 1986, after Roussell announced its decision to
withdraw RU 486 from the market, the French government
threatened Roussell with a transfer of its patent. The Minister of
Health, Claude Evin, stated that he could not permit the abortion
debate to deprive women of a product that represents medical pro-
gress. From the moment governmental approval was granted,
RU 486 became the moral property of women, not just the property
of the drug company.137 The key in this statement is that the
RU 486 represents medical progress. In line with this comment,
George Annas, professor of health law at Boston University, put the
debate in solid terms. He asks: "What if there was an effective pain-
killer developed in another country but a group thought it was bet-
ter to suffer than introduce it into the U.S. market. I feel that, just
as it should be a personal choice whether suffering is redemptive or
a bad thing, it should be a personal choice what procedure a person
uses to accomplish a [permissible] goal."' 38
The fact remains that abortion is not only a permissible medical
decision but a constitutional right. Doctors are angered by what
they see as infringement of politics on what they regard as sound
135. IM
136. Foreman, New Drugs Could Change U.S. Debate on Abortion, Boston Globe, Oct. 2,
1988, at 3 col. 1.
137. Greenhouse, A Fierce Battle: Politics and Profits: The French Abortion Pill R U 486
Sparked Bitter Controversy but Finally Survived., N.Y. Times (Magazine) Feb. 12, 1989 at 23.
138. Boston Globe, Oct 2, 1988, at 3 col. 1.
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and necessary medical practice. 1 9 Likewise, women are angered by
what they see as the minority dictating to them what risks they
must subject themselves to in order to exercise their Constitutional
right to an abortion. RU 486 would allow many women to avoid
surgical abortion with the concurrent risks of infection, cervical in-
jury, and uterine perforation. 1" Further, RU 486 would grant the
abortion decision the privacy that it deserves. We, as a society, must
offer people the best that science can provide so that there may be
more flexibility and personal initiative in the control of familial and
social problems.1 4 ' RU 486 would provide that flexibility and per-
sonal initiative.
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